Conflict over Conflict: The Right to Strike in International Law by Frey, Diane F.
 
Global Labour Journal, 2017, 8(1), Page 17 
 
Conflict over Conflict:  
The Right to Strike in International Law 
 





The existence of a right to strike under international law has been challenged by the International 
Organization of Employers since the late 1980s. The employer group claims that no such right exists 
under international law and has been moving to undermine recognition of the right at the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). This article examines the right to strike in international 
human rights law. It considers specifically the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
finds that the right to strike exists in both of these treaties. Further, the article demonstrates that 
while the ILO employers group may challenge the existence of the right to strike, its government 
members have overwhelmingly ratified international human rights treaties contradicting the employer 
group's position that there is no such right. 
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Today, 64 years since the United Nations declared December 10 a Human Rights Day, the world is 
witnessing an unprecedented attack on one of the most fundamental human rights of all, the right to 




In recent years, there has been a conflict at the International Labour Organisation (ILO) over 
whether there is a right to strike under ILO Convention No. 87 (1948) on Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the Right to Organise. With respect to the ILO, the right to strike has received 
newfound interest and re-examination in recent years (Novitz, 2003; Bellace, 2014a; Hofmann, 
2014). In a thorough recounting of ILO history concerning the right to strike, Janice Bellace (2014a) 
persuasively argues that the right to strike is indeed an inherent corollary to freedom of association 
under Convention No. 87. Bellace (2014a: 31) noted that during discussions leading up to adoption 
of Convention No. 87 at the ILO in 1948, there was no explicit discussion or debate about the 
inclusion of right to strike. She explains that its absence from discussions and the text of Convention 
No. 87 were due to the fact that the parties assumed that the right to strike was an integral and not 
separate element of freedom of association (Bellace, 2014a: 42). As Tonia Novitz (2003: 92) has 
remarked, “the ILO sees freedom of association and the right to strike as inseparably linked”. 
This article takes a different approach from Bellace and Novitz by examining the existence of 
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the right to strike outside of ILO Convention No 87. The article considers the right to strike under 
international human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). It 
argues that the right to strike is enshrined in international law and, further, that a vast majority of 
ILO member states are parties to these treaties and thereby, have recognised the right to strike. In 
this light, the recent controversy at the ILO over whether there is or should be a right to strike 
would be better framed in a holistic fashion taking into account broader human rights obligations of 
ILO member states. After this introduction, this article (1) briefly outlines the history of the 
controversy at the ILO, (2) explains the right to strike under the ICESCR and the ICCPR, (3) 
demonstrates widespread ILO member state support and ratification of treaties recognising the right 
to strike, and (4) concludes that, notwithstanding employer opposition to the inclusion of the right to 
strike under ILO Convention No. 87, the conflict at the ILO will be less intractable if government 
representatives at the ILO remain faithful to their existing commitments to international treaties 




The ILO is unique for its tripartite structure. As with the United Nations (UN), countries are 
members of the ILO. Unlike the United Nations, however, each member state receives four votes: 
one vote for the employers, one vote for the worker representatives, and two votes for government 
representatives. Among the cornerstones of the ILO’s work is legislating and monitoring 
international labour standards through this tripartite governance structure, such as its tripartite 
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) (ILO, Undated a). 
The ILO has been in increasing turmoil since 1989 when the employer group, the International 
Organisation of Employers (IOE), began systematically claiming there is no right to strike under ILO 
Conventions (La Hovary, 2013: 361). Although the specific arguments have evolved, the employer 
group’s overall claim has been that there is no international right to strike. They base their position 
on the absence of an explicit provision enumerating the right to strike in Convention No. 87. The 
Convention provides workers with freedom to join organisations of their own choosing and bestows 
upon those organisations the right to organise their activities and programmes. It does not, however, 
explicitly name the right to strike in the text (ILO, Undated b; Convention No. 87: articles 2, 3, 8 and 
10; Bellace, 2014a: 30). Further, the employer group argues that one of the ILO’s supervisory bodies, 
the Committee of Experts, lacks authority to imply the right to strike in Convention No. 87 because 
“only the International Court of Justice can give authoritative interpretations of ILO Conventions” 
(IOE, 2013: 7).  
Worker representatives have responded that the right to strike has rightfully been considered 
as part of ILO Conventions on Freedom of Association without interruption since 1948, including 
by employer members who have served on the tripartite Committee on Freedom of Association 
(ITUC, 2014b: 17). According to worker representatives, the attack on the right to strike is part of a 
larger effort to undermine the authority of the ILO to monitor and enforce labour standards and to 
turn hard labour standards law into soft law (Hofmann, 2014: 1; ITUC, 2014b: 8).  
The origins of the employer group’s opposition to recognition of the right to strike have been 
attributed to several related factors such as the end of the Cold War, the ascendency of employer 
power relative to labour, and the increasing influence of ILO non-binding pronouncements in 
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domestic policy, as well as regional and domestic court decisions (La Hovary, 2013: 365). Indeed, 
ILO standards on the right to strike have influenced soft laws such as the OECD guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (Van de 
Heijden, 2013: 3; Bellace, 2014a: 59). ILO standards have also influenced court decisions including 
the recent Supreme Court decision in Canada reaffirming the right to strike (Saskatchewan 
Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015, SCC 4: ¶67). The employer group therefore, directly 
challenges the ILO’s legitimacy and influence. 
The disagreement at the ILO has not just been rhetorical. In 2012, the employer group refused 
to cooperate with the yearly Committee on Application of Standards (CAS) that receives reports 
from the Committee of Experts and arranges hearings at the ILO annual conference to draw 
attention to serious problems of labour standards enforcement among ILO member countries 
(Hofmann, 2014: 1; ITUC, 2014b: 5). Ironically, the employers’ concerted activity amounted to a de 
facto strike that prevented ILO supervisory mechanisms from working as intended under its 
Constitution. A subsequent compromise was reached under which the employers agreed to 
cooperate with CAS proceedings and agenda items as long as they did not deal with the issues related 
to the right to strike (Hofmann, 2014: 2). 
The conflict continued to escalate and in October 2013 the ITUC General Council passed a 
resolution to seek referral of the conflict to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (ITUC, 2014b: 
10). Although the employer group argued that the ICJ is the only competent authority that can 
render an opinion on the status of the right to strike under Convention No. 87, they did not seek 
referral to the court (IOE, 2013: 7; ITUC, 2015: ¶4). The ILO Governing Body took up discussion 
of the conflict in March and November of 2014, and decided to engage in further dialogue and 
exploration of options to resolve the conflict in late February 2015 (IOE, 2014: ¶209). In addition to 
the possibility of referral to the ICJ, there was also to be consideration of an internal ILO procedure 
to resolve the dispute by establishing a tribunal under article 37.2 of the ILO Constitution. The 
employer group, with support of some government representatives, advocated for the extended 
dialogue and the tribunal as an alternative to the ICJ (ILO, 2014: ¶47–208). The ITUC noted in its 
follow-up report from the November 2014 meeting that countries which hardly embrace social 
dialogue at home with their own social partners were fervently eager to embrace it at the ILO, most 
likely in an attempt to delay an opinion from the ICJ (ITUC, 2015: ¶6). 
A special meeting took place in February 2015 at the ILO in Geneva to pursue continued 
dialogue on the conflict over the existence of a right to strike as well as alternative ways that the ILO 
could address bolstering support for its labour standards supervisory system. In preparation for the 
meeting, ITUC affiliates organised an international day of protest on February 18 to support the 
right to strike. The Tripartite Meeting held on February 23–25 seems to have deferred the internal 
conflict at the ILO, at least for the moment (IndustriALL, 2015: 1). The employer and worker 
representatives issued a joint statement noting their recognition of the “right to take industrial action 
by workers and employers in support of their legitimate industrial interests” (ILO, 2015b: Appendix 
I). The statement does not, however, signal acceptance of the Committee of Experts jurisprudence 
on the right to strike as binding or authoritative. Governments at the meeting issued a statement 
recognising the right to strike as linked to freedom of association and a fundamental principle and 
right at work, but its scope and the conditions of the right are regulated at the national level (ILO, 
2015b: Appendix II, ¶5). 
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International Treaties on the Right to Strike 
International human rights treaties contradict the employer group’s claim that there is no 
international right to strike. This is most evident in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, which is the international treaty with the most expansive list of work-related 
rights including a specific provision for the right to strike. In addition, although not explicitly 
included among the rights enumerated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the Human Rights Committee (HRC), which is responsible for monitoring implementation of the 
treaty, has upheld the right to strike under its provisions since 1999 (Scheinin and Langford, 2009: 
102; UN HRC, 1999: ¶25).  
 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The work rights enumerated in the ICESCR support many elements of the ILO Decent Work 
Agenda and ILO Conventions (MacNaughton and Frey, 2011: 444). The Covenant’s work-related 
rights include the right to freely chosen work, the right to full employment, the right to fair wages, 
the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to safe and healthy working conditions, the right 
to rest and leisure, the right to form and join trade unions, the right of unions to function freely and 
the right to social security (ICESCR, 1976: art 6(1), 7(a)(i), 11(1), 7(b), 7(d) and 8(a)), 8(c), 8(d)). 
Notably, the ICESCR explicitly includes the right to strike among the union rights elaborated in 
article 8. The treaty states, “The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: (d) The 
right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country" 
(ICESCR, 1976: art 8(1)(d)). Article 8(2) specifies the limits that countries may place on the right, 
noting that “the article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these 
rights by members of the armed forces or of the police or of the administration of the State” 
(ICESCR, 1976: Art 8(2)). Finally, Article 8(3) prevents state parties from using the Covenant to 
undercut or prejudice rights that are provided in ILO Convention No. 87. It states: 
 
Nothing in this article shall authorize State Parties to the International Labour Organisation 
Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise to 
take legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, 
the guarantees provided for in that Convention (ICESCR, 1976: 8(3)). 
 
This latter provision was cited in upholding the right to strike, in Canada when the Canadian Court 
referenced this provision of the ICESCR in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan 
(2015 SCC 4: ¶68). 
Matthew Craven, a professor of international law, published an examination of the origins and 
development of the ICESCR, including of the right to strike. He shows that there was extensive 
debate among the country representatives drafting the Covenant about whether or not to include the 
right to strike in the Covenant (Craven, 1995: 257). Indeed, numerous arguments were put forward 
for omitting it. However, the majority of the drafting committee believed that “the right to strike was 
essential for the protection of the economic and social interests of workers” (Craven, 1995: 257 and 
fn 85). The drafters recognised that it was “meaningless to try to guarantee trade union rights 
without a right to strike” (Craven, 1995: 257 fn 86).  
Debate among drafters also focused on what, if any, limitations should be placed upon worker 
rights to strike. The need to spell out circumstances in which strikes should be limited was 
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questioned by the representative from Yugoslavia who noted that “given the financial constraints on 
strikes, unjustified strike action was extremely unlikely” (Craven, 1995: 258 fn 100). The Yugoslavian 
country representative also cautioned that, “for its own security considerations”, it was dangerous 
and potentially open to abuse to allow the state alone to judge exemptions from the right (Craven, 
1995: 258 fn 98). Further, the representative from the USSR argued that such limitations might 
“encourage governments to attack trade union rights” (Craven, 1995: 258 fn 99). Ultimately, the 
agreed language limiting the right to strike appeased those who opposed its inclusion by making the 
right “subject to the laws of the particular country”, raising the concern that a particular country 
could render it “virtually inoperable” (Craven, 1995: 259). Nevertheless, national limits on the right 
to strike in the Covenant were to be narrowly applied to the armed forces, police and employees 
involved in the administration of the state (ICESCR, 1976: Art 8(2)). Further, state parties to the 
treaty were not to be allowed to use the national limits to undercut provisions of Convention No. 87 
(ICESCR, 1976: Art 8(3)). 
The fact that the right to strike has not been rendered “virtually inoperable” under the 
ICESCR is largely due to the work of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) which monitors the ICESCR’s implementation by countries that adopt the treaty. The UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established the CESCR in 1985 as the body responsible 
for the interpretation and supervision of the ICESCR (Saul, Kinley and Mowbray 2014: 4). The 
CESCR consists of eighteen members. Countries first report within two years of ratifying the 
ICESCR and thereafter every five years on their implementation of the treaty (OHCHR, Undated a). 
The CESCR has issued over 300 Concluding Observations on the state reports since 1992 (Saul et 
al., 2014: 5).  
The CESCR has continued to interpret the meaning and obligations under the Covenant with 
respect to the right to strike. Saul et al. (2014: 579–586) trace the Committee’s work interpreting the 
right to strike along lines that are independent yet cognizant of and congruent with opinions of the 
ILO Committee of Experts and Committee on Freedom of Association. Under the ICESCR, states 
must adopt a legal framework recognising the right to strike and protect the right from unlawful 
interference, and they must also provide effective machinery for the protection of the right and the 
determination of disputes over it (Saul et al., 2014: 580). Concluding Observations concerning 
Germany in 2001 illustrate the Committee’s interpretation of the right to strike under the ICESCR 
relative to ILO Conventions and their interpretation: 
 
The Committee reiterates its concern, in line with the Human Rights Committee and the ILO 
Committee of Experts, that the prohibition by the State party of strikes by public servants other than 
public officials who do not provide essential services, such as judges, so-called Beamte and teachers, 
constitutes a restriction of the activities of trade unions that is beyond the scope of article 8 (2) of the 
Covenant. The Committee disagrees with the State party’s statement that ‘a strike would be 
incompatible with this duty of loyalty and would run counter to the purpose of a professional civil 
service’ (E/C.12/4/Add.3, para. 82), as this interpretation of ‘the administration of the State’ 
mentioned in article 8 (2) of the Covenant exceeds the more restrictive interpretations by the 
Committee, the ILO (Convention No. 98) and the European Court of Justice (CESCR, 2001a).1 
                                                             
1 See also Judy Fudge (2015) for a discussion of the role of courts in Canada and Europe in interpreting the 
right to strike. 
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In addition to Concluding Observations, the CESCR also issues General Comments, which are 
considered “authoritative statements” of its opinions. While they are not formally binding, they are 
considered “highly influential” in establishing the scope and meaning of rights in the ICESCR (Saul 
et al., 2014: 5). In 2006 the CESCR issued General Comment 18 on the right to work under article 6 
of the ICESCR but did not elaborate on the collective dimension of the right to work addressed in 
article 8, which enunciates the right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of 
their choice as well as the right of trade unions to function freely (CESCR, 2006: 2 ¶2). The 
Committee noted, however, that the work rights in articles 6, 7 and 8 of the ICESCR are interrelated 
and interdependent (CESCR, 2006: 3 ¶8). While the Committee has issued General Comments on 
the work rights in article 6 (general right to freely choose work and full employment), article 7 (right 
to just and favourable conditions of work) and article 9 (right to social security), the Committee has 
not yet issued a General Comment on article 8 (union rights) or on the right to strike. 
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
There is no explicit provision on the right to strike in the ICCPR. Article 22 on freedom of 
association states, “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the 
right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests” (ICCPR, 1976: art 22(1)). It 
further provides that:  
 
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law 
and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of 
the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right (ICCPR, 1976: art 22(2)). 
 
As with the ICESCR, the ICCPR makes special allowances for the ILO and Convention No. 87, 
stating in section 3: 
 
Nothing in this article shall authorize State Parties to the International Labour Organisation 
Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise to 
take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, 
the guarantees provided for in that Convention (ICCPR, 1976: art 22(3)). 
 
There are 168 parties to the ICCPR, of which 163 are members of the ILO. Each party submits 
reports to the 18-member Human Rights Committee, initially one year after becoming a party to the 
treaty and every four years thereafter. After examining state reports, the HRC issues Concluding 
Observations outlining its concerns and recommendations. In addition, the HRC administers a 
complaints procedure under the treaty and issues General Comments elaborating on the content of 
the treaty. The HRC ruled in a 1986 case, J.B. v Canada, that the right to strike was not protected 
under the ICCPR (HRC, 1986; Macklem, 2005: 27). What must be highlighted, however, is that after 
this 1986 determination, the HRC has subsequently veered towards consistently upholding the right 
to strike. There has not been another complaint leading to a formal case in which the HRC has ruled 
on the right to strike, but since 1999 the HRC has made comments on periodic reports submitted by 
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countries that are party to the treaty, affirming the existence of a right to strike under the ICCPR 
(Macklem, 2005: 72–73; HRC, 2004: ¶18; HRC, 2010: ¶15). For example, in 2010 in its concluding 
observations on Estonia, the HRC observed: 
 
While noting that the present draft Public Service Act presented to Parliament includes a provision 
restricting the number of public servants not authorized to strike, the Committee is concerned that 
public servants who do not exercise public authority do not fully enjoy the right to strike (HRC, 2010: 
art. 22).  
 
The State Party should ensure in its legislation that only the most limited number of public servants is 
denied the right to strike (HRC, 2010: ¶15). 
 
In sum, the ICCPR and the ICESCR recognise the right to strike and, that it entails obligations for 
countries that are parties to the treaties to respect, protect and fulfil the right to strike. Of course, 
these are obligations only of countries that have become state parties through the process of 
ratification or accession. As indicated in the following section, both the ICCPR and ICESCR enjoy 
widespread acceptance among countries that are members of the ILO, including countries that have 




ILO Member State Support and Ratifications of Treaties Recognising the 
Right to Strike 
The treaties examined above on the right to strike have been widely adopted by ILO member states 
through the ratification process. There are 168 parties to the ICCPR, of which 163 are ILO 
members. There are 164 countries that are parties to the ICESCR, of which 160 are members of the 
ILO. Under the ICESCR, only four countries noted specific objections or reservations to the treaty’s 
provisions on the right to strike at the time of becoming a party to the treaty. In so doing, each 
announced its objection to or clarification of how it would implement the right. Bahrain noted in its 
reservation that it intended to implement the right to strike, reserving its authority to prohibit strikes 
at “essential utilities”. Norway announced that it would continue to refer labour conflicts to its State 
Wage Boards, and this practice it considered compatible with the right to strike in the treaty. France 
announced it would implement the right to strike consistent with the European Social Charter. More 
noteworthy was Kuwait, which reserved the right not to apply the provisions of the treaty 
concerning the right to strike. This raised objections from Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway and 
Sweden (UNTC, undated). 
The list of state parties to the ICCPR and ICESCR show that the vast majority of the 153 
countries that have ratified Convention No. 87 have also recognised the right to strike in other 
international treaties. 
 
Countries that have not ratified Convention No. 87 
The employer group has been challenging ILO Convention No. 87, claiming that it does not include 
the right to strike. Of the ILO’s 187 member countries, 153 have ratified ILO Convention No. 87 
(ILO, undated b). While this is a strong majority of ILO member states (82 per cent), the 34 
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countries that have not ratified the Convention represent a significant portion of the world’s 
population including Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, New Zealand and the United States (ILO, 
undated c). Nevertheless, if one takes into account other international instruments, such as the 
ICESCR and ICCPR, the picture that emerges is remarkably different (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1. ILO member countries that have not ratified Convention No. 87 
Country ICCPR Status ICESCR Status 
Action Date Action Date 
1. Afghanistan Accession 24 Jan 1983 Accession 24 Jan 1983 
2. Bahrain Accession 20 Sep 2006 Accession 27 Sep 2007 
3. Brazil Accession 24 Jan 1992 Accession 24 Jan 1992 
4. Brunei Darussalam --- --- --- --- 
5. China Signed 5 Oct 1998 Ratified 27 Mar 2001 
6. Cook Islands --- --- --- --- 
7. Guinea-Bissau Ratified 1 Nov 2010 Accession 2 Jul 1992 
8. India Accession 10 Apr 1979 Accession 10 Apr 1979 
9. Iran Ratified 24 Jun 1975 Ratified 24 Jun 1975 
10. Iraq Ratified 25 Jan 1971 Ratified 25 Jan 1971 
11. Jordan Ratified 28 May 1975 Ratified 28 May 1975 
12. Kenya Accession 1 May 1972 Accession 1 May 1972 
13. Laos Ratified 25 Sep 2009 Ratified 13 Feb 2007 
14. Lebanon Accession 3 Nov 1972 Accession 3 Nov 1972 
15. Malaysia --- --- --- --- 
16. Marshall Islands --- --- --- --- 
17. Morocco Ratified 3 May 1979 Ratified 3 May 1979 
18. Nepal Accession 14 May 1991 Accession 14 May 1991 
19. New Zealand Ratified 28 Dec 1978 Ratified 28 Dec 1978 
20. Oman --- --- --- --- 
21. Palau Signed 20 Sep 2011 Signed 20 Sep 2011 
22. Qatar --- --- --- --- 
23. Rep. of Korea Accession 10 Apr 1990 Accession 10 Apr 1990 
24. Saudi Arabia --- --- --- --- 
25. Singapore --- --- --- --- 
26. South Sudan --- --- --- --- 
27. Sudan Accession 18 Mar 1986 Accession 18 Mar 1986 
28. Thailand Accession 29 Oct 1996 Accession 5 Sep 1999 
29. Tonga --- --- --- --- 
30. Tuvalu --- --- --- --- 
31. United Arab Emirates --- --- --- --- 
32. United States  Ratified 8 Jun 1992 Signed 5 Oct 1977 
33. Uzbekistan* Accession 28 Sep 1995 Accession 28 Sep 1995 
34. Vietnam Accession 24 Sep 1982 Accession 24 Sep 1982 
Note: Ratified and acceded refer to two different means by which countries may adopt a treaty. Ratified signifies that the 
country signed and subsequently formally ratified the treaty. Acceded means that the country formally adopted the treaty 
without having first signed it. There is no appreciable difference between ratifying and acceding to the treaty for purposes 
of obligations under the treaty. Signed means the country signed the treaty without taking further action to formally 
adopt the treaty. 
*Uzbekistan ratified Convention No. 87 on 12 December 2016 but it will not come into force until 12 December 2017. 
Sources: ILO (Undated b); UN OHCHR (Undated b).  
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Although thirty-four ILO member countries have not ratified Convention No. 87, nineteen of them 
have nevertheless ratified the ICESCR which explicitly recognises the right to strike, as well as the 
ICCPR. Among the largest countries, in terms of population, each is a party to at least one of the 
treaties that recognises the right to strike. For example, the United States ratified the ICCPR and also 
signed the ICESCR. Similarly, China ratified the ICESCR and signed the ICCPR. Signing a treaty 
rather than ratifying it entails a lower-level of obligation; nevertheless, countries that sign a treaty and 
do not subsequently ratify it must “refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of 
the treaty” (UN, 1969: art 18). Clearly, the right to strike has been recognised in treaties adopted by 
many countries, including by the largest and most powerful ones, such as the United States and 
China.  
Of the 187 countries that are members of the ILO, there are only thirteen countries that have 
neither ratified ILO Convention No. 87, nor ratified either the ICESCR or ICCPR. These countries 
are: Brunei Darussalam, Cook Islands, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Oman, Palau, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, South Sudan, Tonga, Tuvalu and United Arab Emirates. As such, recognition of the right 
to strike is almost universal. 
 
Countries that have ratified ILO Convention No. 87 
There are 154 ILO member states that have ratified ILO Convention No. 87. Among these there is 
evidence of broad commitment to recognising the right to strike beyond ILO Convention No 87. In 
fact, 139 of these member states (90.8 per cent) have ratified the ICESCR and ICCPR in addition to 
ILO Convention No. 87. There are only four countries that have ratified ILO Convention No. 87 
without also having ratified, acceded to or signed either the ICESCR or ICCPR. These countries are: 
Antigua and Barbuda, Fiji, Kiribati, and Saint Kitts and Nevis. In summary, overwhelmingly, 
countries that have ratified ILO Convention No. 87 have also recognised the right to strike in other 
international human rights treaties. 
In addition to the sheer number of countries that have recognised the right to strike in 
international human rights treaties as well as in ILO Convention No. 87, it is also important to note 
that a significant number of countries have recognised the right to strike since the inception of the 
employer group’s campaign to derecognise the right to strike. The ILO continuously encourages 
member countries to ratify conventions or alternatively to explain their reasons for non-ratification. 
Remarkably, after initiation of employer objections to the right to strike in 1989, fifty-six ILO 
member countries ratified ILO Convention No. 87. In addition, seventy-seven ILO member 
countries have ratified or acceded to the ICCPR since 1990 and six ILO members have signed on to 
the ICCPR. With respect to the ICESCR, seventy ILO member countries have become parties to the 
treaty since 1 January 1990, and five ILO member countries have signed on to the ICESCR. 
Clearly a country’s signature or formal ratification of a treaty or ILO Convention does not 
signal compliance with and fulfilment of treaty duties and obligations. China’s constitutional 
protection of the right to strike was removed in 1982 and strikes are not legally protected despite the 
fact that China became a party to the ICESCR in 2001 (Ewing, 2013; Chang and Cook, 2015: 445). 
Nevertheless, because China is a party to the ICESCR as well as to the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the ILO and CESCR opinions about the content of the 
right to strike matter in an authoritative way (Ewing, 2013). Similarly, the United States, although a 
party to the ICCPR since 1977, has no constitutional protection of the right to strike, and federal and 
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state public employee rights to strike are severely limited. Japan has ratified ILO Convention No. 87 
as well as the ICCPR and ICESCR, and has a constitutionally protected right to strike, although that 
right has been severely restricted by legislation and court decisions (Ishida, 2015: 312). In 2001 the 
CESCR issued a Concluding Observation critical of Japan’s treatment of the right to strike with 
respect to public employees (CESCR, 2001b: ¶21). Japan responded by voicing its non-recognition 
of the ILO Committee of Expert opinions concerning the right to strike under Convention No. 87 
(Japan Follow-up, 2002: ¶5(1)).  
The CESCR has persisted in interpreting the right to strike under the ICESCR in ways that are 
largely congruent with the ILO. At times the CESCR has explicitly referenced the ILO Committee of 
Experts – for example in Poland, Malta, Korea and Jamaica (CESCR, 2002a, 2004a, 2009a, 2013), as 
well as the Committee on Freedom of Association in Cambodia (CESCR, 2009b). At other times, the 
CESCR references the ILO or ILO Conventions alone without regard to specific ILO opinions 
about them as, for example, in Australia, Benin, Azerbaijan, India and Montenegro (CESCR, 2000, 
2002b, 2004b, 2008, 2014). Critically, the CESCR has been upholding the integrity of the content and 





Given the evidence, it would be disingenuous for ILO member countries that are parties to 
international human rights treaties recognising the right to strike to claim at the ILO that no such 
right exists. Indeed, government members of the ILO jointly affirmed their recognition of the right 
to strike at the February 2015 meeting (ILO, 2015b, 2015c). The United States also noted its 
recognition of the right to strike under ILO Convention No. 87 (ILO, 2015c: ¶16). Employers as 
constituents at the ILO are not parties to the ICCPR or ICESCR, and so it is not surprising that they 
would campaign based on their interests in undermining and narrowing union rights. Many national 
governments, as employers themselves, may share those anti-union interests with private-sector 
employers. Nevertheless, the right to strike is solidly enshrined in international human rights treaties 
as well as in ILO Convention No. 87, and state parties to the treaties have a duty to respect, protect 
and fulfil their obligations. 
Although the most recent controversy has passed at the ILO, at least for the moment, the 
human rights and ILO foundations for the right to strike have yet to be fully enmeshed to strengthen 
recognition of the right to strike. Coherence between the ILO and human rights treaties systems 
helps ensure that the controversy does not erode the right to strike or the ILO as a global 
governance institution. Notably, the government group at the ILO recognised that the right to strike 
is encompassed within the ILO’s Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which is a significant 
step forward (IndustriALL, 2015: 1; ILO, 2015b: 2, 2015c). More importantly, examination of the 
recent meeting documents indicates that agreement was reached in a manner that at least began to 
recognise the right to strike in international law apart from ILO standards (ILO, 2015c: ¶11, 15, 25). 
Three different government representatives speaking on behalf of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, the European Union and Nordic countries explicitly noted that the right to strike is 
enshrined in other international instruments such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ILO 2015c: ¶11, 13, 15). The government representative speaking on behalf of 
the Nordic countries also noted the overlap between ratification of the ICESCR and ILO 
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Convention No. 87 (ILO, 2015c: ¶15). 
It is significant that government representatives of the European Union, Latin America, the 
Caribbean and Nordic countries embedded their support of the right to strike at the ILO with other 
existing international human rights treaty obligations such as the ICESCR. Their acknowledgement 
creates the potential to unite the ILO and human rights systems in one coherent framework 
affirming the right to strike. With support and encouragement from the CESCR and HRC, that 
coherence can take on a greater and more permanent influence. Hopefully, the CESCR will soon 
issue a General Comment on union rights under article 8 affirming the existence of the right to strike 
and the ILO’s competence to provide useful guidance on its legitimate exercise. Human rights 
treaties and the UN Committees authorised to monitor their implementation have much to 
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